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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT

Victory v. Coughlin 13 1
(decided April 4, 1991)

The petitioners, Albert Victory, a state prisoner, and his wife,
Susan Block, brought an article 78 proceeding seeking a
declaration that the prison authorities' decision denying Victory's
visiting privileges with Block violated his constitutional right to
due process under the state constitution. 132 The court held that
convicted felons do not have a fundamental right to visitation
133
protected by the state constitution.
Victory had previously escaped prison, with the help of his
wife, while serving a twenty-five year to life sentence for the
felony murder of a policeman. A child was born to them while
they were fugitives. That child was permitted to visit, but his
wife was not because the facility determined that she was a security risk. 134
Victory and Block relied on the New York Court of Appeals'
decision Cooper v. Morin,135 which held that pretrial detainees
are entitled to contact visitation, unless there is a strong showing
of necessity. 13 6 The Victory court noted that there is a clear
distinction between pretrial detainees, who are presumed
innocent, and convicted felons. 137 The holding in Cooper was

131. 165 A.D.2d 402, 568 N.Y.S.2d 186 (3d Dep't 1991).
132. Id. at 404, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187; see N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The
defendant had originally brought a claim under the United States Constitution

as well, but that claim had apparently been abandoned. Victory, 165 A.D.2d at
404 n.1, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187 n.1.
133. Victory, 165 A.D.2d at 404, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
134. Id. at 403, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
135. 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
136. Id. at 81, 399 N.E.2d at 1195, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 176.

137.

ictory, 165 A.D.2d at 404, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
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"explicitly limited to pretrial detainees .... "138 The court also
found that "visitation privileges which are generally permitted
within the State's correctional facilities [do not] give rise to a
'legitimate expectation' which in turn attains to the level of a
'protected interest' under the State Constitution." ' 139 The court
explained that "[w]hen access to a program is based upon
objective criteria and enjoyment of participation is contingent
upon subjective factors, a 'legitimate expectation' is not
14 0
warranted and no constitutional right arises."
The court found that the determination was rational based on
the supreme court's finding of the defendants' "continual disregard of societal norms and an unwillingness to abide by the
terms of .

. confinement. ' 141 The court also rejected the

prisoner's "contention[] that the denial of visitation constitute[d]
cruel and unusual punishment." 142
The United States Supreme Court, in Kentucky Department of
Corrections v. Thompson, 143 held that in order to establish a
liberty interest that is entitled to the protection of the Due Process
Clause, the state regulations must use "explicit mandatory
language" in connection with the establishment of "specific...
substantive predicates" to limit discretion. 144 The Supreme
Court, citing Hewitt v. Helms, 145 explained that the denial of a
particular visitor "is well within the terms of confinement
ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence" 146 and is thus not
protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution. 147 However, the court then explained that the state
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 404-05, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 187 (citing Doe v. Coughlin, 71
N.Y.2d 48, 55, 518 N.E.2d 536, 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782, 787 (1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988)).
141. Id. at 405, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
142. Id.
143. 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
144. Id. at 463.
145. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
146. Kentucky, 490 U.S. at 461.
147. Id.
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14 8
may create enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting.
14 9
The New York Court of Appeals, in Doe v. Coughlin,
found that if regulations exist that promise certain benefits, so
long as participation in the program is not contingent upon
subjective factors, a protected interest may arise. 150 Therefore,
the state and federal courts appear to be consistent in their
application of due process to this right potentially arising in the
prison context.

Children's Village v. Holbrook1 51
(decided November 21, 1991)

Children's Village, a not-for-profit child care agency, brought
an article 78 proceeding appealing the denial of its application for
a special permit to operate a group home in a single-family
residential district. 152 The court held the zoning ordinance to be
facially invalid under the due process clause of the New York
State Constitution 153 insofar as it restricted the size of a
"functionally equivalent" family while not similarly restricting
the size of a traditional family. 154
Children's Village proposed to operate a group home for up to
ten abused or neglected adolescent boys in an R-22 zoning district
in the Town of Clarkstown. Under the Town Zoning Ordinance,
single-family detached residences are permitted as of right in an
R-22 district. 155 "Family" is defined as "[a]ny number of
individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption [or not more
148. Id.

149. 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988).
150. Id. at 55, 518 N.E.2d at 540-41, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87 (when a
state adopts programs where there is an expectation of early release from
prison or a family reunion, an expectation of certain rights arises, however, if
there is a regulatory scheme attached to that program, no legitimate
expectation exists).

151. 171 A.D.2d 298, 576 N.Y.S.2d 405 (3d Dep't 1991).
152. Id. at 299-300, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.

153. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
154. Children's Village, 171 A.D.2d at 300-01, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.

155. Id. at 299, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
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